Future of Pakistan — implications for Bhārat

Gautam R. Desiraju

Reasonable discussion among the educated classes in India seems to be veering around to the inevitability of a break-up of Pakistan within the next three to five years. The exact time does not matter, and what is more meaningful is that a country that was set up as a client of the West, has since transformed itself as a rentier state, a garrison for hire, a cricket team with a country attached, an army with a country attached, a non-country, a collapsed state, a Muslim seminary, a poverty wracked land with a ruined riverine system that was the grain bowl of a country that was ahead of India in most economic indicators till 2000.

Since Pakistan was a part of undivided India till 1947, we Indians have more than an average interest in our peculiar western neighbour, more so because we perhaps understand them better than any other country does, simply because we are of the same land, have the same DNA, and share the same culture, traditions and modes of behavior, even even though we subscribe to different faiths, and even here we have a caveat in that almost as many Muslims live in India (20 crore) as in Pakistan (23 crore).

Peculiarly, the 1947 partition of India was an ad hoc arrangement in response to an immediate political problem that could not be solved in a short time framework. Britain in particular had a strong vested interest in an independent state in the northwest corner of India that it could ‘manage’ in its own geopolitical interest, this periphery of India being contiguous with Soviet Central Asia, Iran and West Asia, and Tibet and Western China — the pivot of the Eurasia. Britain subsequently handed over its ‘ownership’ to the US, which shamelessly used this ‘ownership’ to render Pakistan as little more than a vassal or serf.

It is in this context that the future of Pakistan must be considered. With the waxing and waning interest that the big powers, the US, China and Russia, seem to be showing now with respect to Pakistan, and its overall economic condition where there is no hope for any kind of normal commercial and manufacturing activity that would give this ‘country’ a semblance of any life whatsoever, the safe overall consensus seems to be that Pakistan as the country we know it now in terms of a political map — four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Balochistan — will not exist as such in the short to medium term future. Even now, large portions of the latter two provinces are not in the sovereign custody of what one might approximately call the State of Pakistan. Let us assume that Pakistan will not exist in its present form in five years time. What are the implications for Bhārat?

Four consequences are of note:

(1) India will definitely acquire the name Bhārat, and there will no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are Bhārat and not India. The reason for this is very simple; the hard border of the Radcliffe Line will morph into a soft border that ends at the eastern bank of the Sindhu, restoring the original limit of Bharatavarsha. It does not matter if mostly Muslims live in those areas. There are 65 crore Muslims in what was India on 14 August 1947. They have to live somewhere.

(2) All the territories that Maharaja Hari Singh ruled in October 1947 will become part of the Republic of India. This includes PoJK, Gilgit, Baltistan, and the Shaksgam valley. The border with China in Aksai Chin will probably remain undefined, as neither country wants to control this empty region. Civilizational states often have unclear borders. Chitral could become the border between Bhārat and Afghanistan, and India might gain access to Central Asia through the Wakhan corridor. For the first time in 500 years, India and Russia would share a friendly, direct border.

3) The breakup of Pakistan will also affect Bangladesh, which has struggled with its identity since Partition. As it comes to terms with itself, Bangladesh may find it easier and more beneficial to work with its large neighbor, India. This will improve the situation in India’s northeast, and China will realize its ability to pressure Bhārat is limited. Although China is upstream on the Brahmaputra, most of the river’s water comes from rainfall within India, so China cannot do much about it.

(4) After Pakistan breaks up, most of what remains will be in present-day Punjab, with a population of 13 crore—over half of Pakistan’s current population. Punjabi Muslims control most of the country’s resources, including land, money, business, and the military. This new, small, landlocked country will be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and may be home to people who feel angry and bitter toward India. It could become a source of ongoing problems for Bhārat. Unless India finds a way to manage this region, it could become a lawless area. The mindset of Punjabi Muslims is unique, and it would be wise for us to study it more closely.

In summary, we should consider the consequences of events in Pakistan in the immediate and short-term future. This is a matter of direct import for Bharat.