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Delimitation is, as the name suggests, a limiting process of something, and most often it refers to the drawing of boundaries to enclose spaces where every inhabitant can, if he or she is eligible, vote in a parliamentary or assembly election.
Over the last few years, I've encountered these common questions from Indian citizens about delimitation, something most of us hadn’t even heard of a few years ago. I started writing some short articles about this around a decade ago, and my latest book, “India: Science, Politics, Geostrategy” from Garuda Press, assesses them with the wisdom of hindsight. The essence of my argument is that correct delimitation can occur only if the states of India are roughly equal in size, meaning we have around 75 states, each with a population of approximately two crore.
Here are the questions I’ve been asked with my answers:
1. India’s current delimitation freeze has created a fundamental imbalance in representation. What were the main factors behind this freeze, and why has it persisted for so long despite its obvious drawbacks?
The delimitation freeze was a product of the emergency, a time when informed policymaking and domestic political discourse were, to a large extent, suspended. While the ostensible reason was to encourage family planning, the apparent cause was the Congress's then electoral interests. The northern parts of the country were hosting incipient political movements against not just the Congress as a party but also the ideology it had imposed on the country. The delimitation freeze was essentially a constitutional gerrymander, where the value of votes in northern parts was artificially deflated as a counterbalance to the emergent forces that have spawned not just the present BJP but regional outfits that have displaced the Congress as well. The extension of the freeze during the Vajpayee years was due to the shaky coalition that underpinned it, forcing the government to pick and choose its battles carefully. Today, undoing this freeze in accordance with the scheme is not only electorally suitable for all involved but also puts the national interest at the forefront.
2. How does the current imbalance in state sizes and representation impact federalism, governance, and economic decision-making at the central level?
The number of seats a state holds in the Lok Sabha is, in effect, determinative of its value vis-à-vis the Union. This is because, ultimately, parties in larger states like Uttar Pradesh can be crucial kingmakers in the Lok Sabha and beyond. This also gives some states outsized bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre. Hence, the devolution of tax revenue from the divisible pool, as well as financing or grants-in-aid, often flows along electoral lines. This severely warps the principles of propriety that ought to govern our quasi-federal setup, permits extractive governments to become entrenched in states, and causes severe misallocation, which damages the entire country's growth prospects. The vast difference in state sizes, ranging from just one seat for Sikkim to a mammoth 80 for Uttar Pradesh, distorts governance priorities.
3. States like Goa and Bihar are treated differently by the Union. Can you provide specific examples of how this disparity manifests in policy decisions, resource allocation, and governance?
The delimitation freeze exaggerates or diminishes a state's electoral value relative to its population, thereby distorting political and policy outcomes. Bihar, for example, has the fourth largest number of seats in the Lok Sabha. This ensures constant political attention to the state. At the same time, the relatively lower value of the Bihari voter artificially lowers their standing within the state. Bihar's large number of seats puts it ahead of small states like Goa, which may be facing similar developmental issues in the central government's list of priorities. The nature of funds allotted to Bihar, as well as per capita funding, will remain geared towards political clientelism, because the Bihari vote is undervalued. These phenomena breed corruption and misallocation, thereby delaying developmental outcomes.
4. What economic benefits do you foresee from redrawing state boundaries to ensure population parity? Would smaller, more uniformly sized states lead to greater economic efficiency and governance effectiveness?
The economic benefits are manifold. In general, evidence suggests that smaller states in India that were separated from larger states have outstripped those larger states in economic terms. Smaller, more uniformly sized states have multiple advantages. Firstly, their bargaining power with respect to each other and the centre becomes more or less equalised, preventing any long-term favouritism. Secondly, it has been observed that India has few 'second cities' of note, i.e., cities of comparable size to the state capitals. This capital-city-centric functioning of states has led to severe economic inequalities within states, as administrative focus beyond the immediate vicinity of the capital dissipates. A smaller area and increased homogeneity also allow for the cultivation of specialised goods and products, which is a positive for both the state and the national economy. Specialisation, focus, and equality are all features of my scheme.
5. Redrawing state boundaries is an immensely complex and politically sensitive issue. What key challenges—constitutional, administrative, and political—would need to be addressed to make such a reform a reality?
Is it really? Not if it is done across the country. There is no significant constitutional challenge as such; in essence, we are requesting a return to the original constitutional scheme of Articles 81 and 82, but extending it to states as well. When the constitution was framed, we had an asymmetric system of Part A, Part B, and Part C states, which were standardised later. The parliament has been granted the unilateral power to make or break states. The book illustrates the close relationship between state sizes and delimitation, which naturally implies that the periodic delimitation exercise has to be connected to state reorganisation as well. The challenges to this are not constitutional—if anything, it only builds upon the original constitutional scheme. The challenges are purely political at this point. However, smaller states end up benefiting all electoral incumbents one way or another, which evokes hope that, even if for their own narrow interests, a delimitation in accordance with what we have stated in the book may nonetheless be undertaken.
6. How do you counter concerns that smaller states might weaken India’s national unity or create additional governance inefficiencies, particularly in terms of coordination and resource distribution?
The concern is quite unfounded, and smaller states only foster political integration. Firstly, the disproportionate sizes of states in the northern parts of the country and the 'balkanization' of the southern states (as B.R. Ambedkar wrote) have led to a feeling of alienation and inequity for states in the south or east. Equalising state sizes would render all states equal in the eyes of the centre, addressing some of these sentiments. Secondly, the adoption of the 'one language, one state' standard has also led to linguistic insecurity and chauvinism, resulting in many unnecessary tussles across the country. Smaller states allow micro identities under broader umbrellas to be recognised, prosper, and ultimately feel secure, thereby minimising identitarian grievances. Further, the differences in identity between neighbouring states today are vast, leading to a strong sense of differentiation and identification. Smaller states mean that differences between neighbouring states become much subtler and less pronounced, further reducing animosity. Lastly, the specialisation of production and the equalisation of bargaining power will improve economic outcomes, reducing inefficiencies rather than creating them. It's a win-win for all involved, save for such people who have made entire political careers by fanning the flames of linguistic chauvinism.
7. Given the political implications of redistributing parliamentary seats, how can we ensure that delimitation is carried out in a manner that is fair, transparent, and free from political manipulation?
Had delimitation not been frozen, the country would have had a fully functioning delimitation commission, much like the election commission, which would have undertaken such an exercise. Since delimitation and states' reorganisation are intimately linked, state reorganisations should be carried out on a recurrent basis to maintain approximate equalisation of seats and be done by the same commission. Hence, the constitutionally ordained delimitation commission should have its mandate expanded to states' reorganisation as well. This is a sufficiently robust mechanism to minimise gerrymandering or undue influence.
8. Looking ahead, what are the key policy steps needed to build momentum for this critical reform, and how do you envision a more equitable and efficient democratic structure for Bharat in the future?
The first step is to explain to the country's people that the delimitation freeze and the current state of affairs are suboptimal for all involved. The issue is being typified as a north vs south debate, when in fact, such a paradigm is only a symptom of the underlying malaise. A return to Bhārat's civilizational norm of small administrative units is the only legible solution to achieve “Each Vote Same Value” and “Each State Same Heft”; the macro must align with the micro, and vice versa. This has to be a national issue debated by the thinking segments of our society and is too important an exercise to be left to politicians and jurists. The delimitation freeze and its extension are the result of insufficient national dialogue and an unimaginative political class that wants to take the most convenient, not the most effective, course of action. The democratic structure of this country is the preserve of the people, not its politicians, judges, or commentariat.
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