ABOUT THE BOOK:

The history of communism is strewn with violence, world over; violence has been an integral part of the practice of communism. Communist regimes across the globe have been resorting to violence on the pretext of removing inequality by force, with communist theories teaching that the victory of the proletariat is dependent on the utilization of violence in some form or the other. So the one thing that communist regimes could never handle was conflict resolution; no communist regime has ever known how to handle dissent.

Political violence in West Bengal was started, practiced and stitched into the polity by communists, with the ideological backing of communism. Much before the communists came to power in the state with a majority, the year 1970 saw the gruesome murder of leaders opposed to them in the town of Barddhaman in Sain Bari. In 1979, the communist regime and cadres murdered the lower caste refugees of East Bengal in Marichjhapi—this was nothing short of the “pit murder” done of Jews in concentration camps. In 1982 came the murder of monks of Ananda Magra in broad daylight in the state capital, Calcutta, as it was called then. In 1990, Bantala saw the brutal killing and rape of lady government health officers and the driver of the vehicle. Suchpur in Nanoor in the district of Birbhum also witnessed the killing of landless laborers under the active participation of top communist leaders. The burning of villagers trapping them inside a thatch-roofed village house in Chhoto Angaria is shrouded in mystery even today. The culmination of such cruelty against poor villagers was witnessed In 2007, in Nandigram, when the abjectly poor villagers were bombed, killed, fired upon and thrown into the river in support of a tainted crony capitalist of the Salim Group of Indonesia —the world had never so far seen such cruelty inflicted on the poor by communists, in support of a crony capitalist.

The leftist cabal has managed to keep these gruesome misdeeds under wraps through the vice-like grip it has on the editorial community in publishing houses. This book attempts to record the history of the gruesome West Bengal violence for posterity—because—truth must be laid out.

Contents

✍ Sain Bari Killings

Festival of lynching starts

✍Marichjhapi Massacre

Massacre of Homeless Refugees

✍Let’s Lynch Policemen

The festival of lynching continues

✍Burning of Ananda Marga Monks

Lynching and barbeque of helpless monks

✍Bantala Rape and Murder

Lynch and rape as a tool to wipe out evidence

✍Suchpur Butchery of Landless Labourers

Lynching of have-nots by the have-nots, for the Tsars

✍Chhoto Angaria: Tale of Angar

Group immolation...faster than lynching

✍Killing Fields of Nandigram

High-tech gun-lynching by harmads and the classic fightback

Foreword

There are both national and regional variations in the way an idea descends from the lofty heights of intellectualism to base realities on the ground. Communism is one of the most appropriate case studies of this phenomenon. The philosophy of Karl Marx didn’t quite permeate into India in the 19th century, although there were intellectuals who were somewhat familiar with his writings. The absence of any substantial working class in India also ensured that the penetration of socialist ideas through trades unions was very limited. Indeed, it was only after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) to spread the revolution globally, that the Red Flag made its presence in India.

The Communist Party which was established in India on Christmas Day 1925 was always over-dependant on the Soviet Union for inspiration, resources, and direction. Undeniably, there were individuals such as Manabendra Nath Roy and Soumyendra Nath Tagore who were intellectual stalwarts. But it was precisely their independence of spirit and their insistence that the revolution in India must chart its own course that distanced them from Moscow. So formidable was the hold of the Soviet Union on the Indian Communist movement that the brutalities associated with Lenin and Stalin were internalised by the Indian comrades.

It is not that the leadership of the CPI lacked compassion and humanity. In their individual capacity, many of them were exemplary individuals and often extremely creative. However, thrust into the collective milieu of ‘the party’, they became part of a mob. Worse, some of the most unprincipled alliances and worst depredations were justified as being in the larger interests of the party. It is also significant that Communists rarely owned up to the error of their ways. The ‘party line’ would often change inexplicably and there would be a leadership purge, but the reasons behind the flawed politics were rarely dissected.

In 1946, for example, in pursuance of a so-called elaboration of the ‘national question’ by party leader Gangadhar Adhikari, the CPI of the day decided to throw in its lot behind the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. Shortly after Independence in 1948, in line with the Zhdanov thesis adopted by the world Communist movement, the CPI proclaimed that India’s azadi was a lie and that it would organise an insurrection against the Jawaharlal Nehru government. By 1951, this approach was abandoned, and the CPI accepted the importance of winning power through elections. Each of these political shifts were important but they were invariably thrust on the party rank-and-file from above. In most cases, the directions came from Moscow.

The split in the Communist movement after the Sino-Soviet schism in 1964 led to the CPI(M) becoming the main force in India, and particularly in West Bengal and Kerala. The CPI(M) was not guided by Moscow and while it was second to none in its admiration for the Chinese Communist Party, it was not under its direction. However, the political culture of the party, particularly its unabashed admiration of Stalin, ensured continuity with the earlier practices of the movement. In theory, the CPI(M) was committed to the organisational principles of democratic centralism. In practice it meant that the party was guided by strict hierarchical norms.

After the CPI(M) in West Bengal won power in 1977, defeating a dispirited and discredited, post-Emergency Congress, it crafted one of the most formidable electoral machines in India. Until the party finally imploded over the issue of land acquisition for industry, the CPI(M) both ruled and controlled West Bengal with an iron hand. In practice this meant that the Local Committees of the party also exercised control over social issues involving marriages and relationships. Nothing was allowed to happen in any locality without the party’s permission. The writ of the party was imposed, if necessary, through violence and bloodshed. It was this localised system of tyrannical control that held sway in West Bengal for over three decades.

In this meticulously researched book, Debu Ghatak has studied some of the important landmarks in the violent history of West Bengal under the CPI(M). It was important to document the local dynamics that contributed to the horrible incidents of violence. They help to illustrate the way the CPI(M) exercised total control over a frightened population.

At one level, what this book documents is history. At the same time, the political culture centred on the ruthless use of violence, has proved more enduring than the political sway of the CPI(M).

—Swapan Dasgupta

Eminent Columnist & Former Rajya Sabha MP